

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-12

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L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05 SP-02
SS-15 ICA-11 TRSE-00 NSC-05 /094 W
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R 191714Z JUL 78
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3124
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO USMISSION USNATO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 5 MBFR VIENNA 0448

FM US REP MBFR

E O 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO
SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: JULY 19 WESTERN PLENARY STATEMENT

THE 178TH PLENARY MEETING OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, THE
LAST OF THE FIFTEENTH ROUND, WAS HELD ON JULY 19 UNDER
THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF US DEPREP, WHO, TOGETHER WITH
SOVIET REP (TARASOV), DELIVERED THE ONLY STATEMENTS.
THE SOVIET STATEMENT IS REPORTED BY SEPTEL. IN HIS
PRESENTATION, US DEPREP REVIEWED COMMENTS MADE TO DATE
BY WESTERN REPS ON INDIVIDUAL ASPECTS OF THE EASTERN
PROPOSALS OF JUNE 8, STRESSED THAT WESTERN PROPOSALS,
AS AUGMENTED ON APRIL 19, CLEARLY PROVIDED THE BASIS
FOR AN EQUITABLE OUTCOME TO THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND REITERATED
THAT AGREEMENT ON DATA REMAINS THE CENTRAL ISSUE
OF THE TALKS. SHORT PERSONAL COMMENT AT END OF US
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DEPREP'S STATEMENT WAS IN RESPONSE TO MENTION OF
THE NEUTRON WARHEAD IN SOVIET REP'S PLENARY STATE-
MENT. FOLLOWING SESSION, UK, FRG, AND NETHERLANDS
REPS THANKED US DEPREP FOR ADDING COMMENT. THE FULL
TEXT OF THE US PLENARY STATEMENT FOLLOWS BELOW.

BEGIN TEXT:

WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAVE THROUGHOUT THE NEARLY FIVE YEARS OF THESE TALKS DONE EVERYTHING THEY COULD TO REACH AN AGREEMENT CONSISTENT WITH THE AGREED GOALS OF THESE TALKS AND WITH THE REQUIREMENT OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL. IN NOVEMBER 1973, THE WEST MADE PROPOSALS PROVIDING FOR MILITARILY IMPORTANT MANPOWER REDUCTIONS AND FOR THE FULLY EQUITABLE OUTCOME OF APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES.

IN DECEMBER 1975, AND AGAIN IN APRIL 1978, WESTERN PARTICIPANTS MADE MOVES OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE WHICH CHANGED IN IMPORTANT WAYS THE MILITARY OUTCOME ENVISAGED BY THE ORIGINAL WESTERN PROPOSALS. IN THE FIRST OF THESE MOVES, THE WEST ADDED TO ITS ORIGINAL OFFER REDUCTIONS OF CERTAIN US NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS OF GREAT DESTRUCTIVE POWER, AS WELL AS ENDURING LIMITATIONS ON THE RESIDUAL LEVEL OF US ARMAMENTS OF THE TYPES REDUCED, WITHOUT ADDING TO EASTERN REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS.

THE GREAT MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE OBLIGATIONS TO BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE WEST UNDER ITS DECEMBER 1975 PROPOSALS WOULD HAVE ENTITLED THE WEST TO MAINTAIN ITS CALL FOR THE WITHDRAWAL IN THE FIRST PHASE OF AN ENTIRE SOVIET TANK ARMY WITH ALL ITS ARMAMENTS. NEVERTHELESS, IN APRIL OF THIS YEAR, IN AN EFFORT TO MOVE THESE NEGOTIATIONS INTO A DECISIVE STAGE, THE WEST SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED ITS OWN PHASE I OBLIGATIONS AND RELAXED ITS PHASE I REQUIREMENTS ON THE USSR, WHICH WOULD

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NOW BE OBLIGED TO WITHDRAW 68,000 SOLDIERS, FIVE DIVISIONS AND 1700 MAIN BATTLE TANKS. LIMITS WOULD BE PLACED ON THE RESIDUAL LEVEL OF SOVIET MANPOWER AND TANKS. WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAVE THUS CONSTRUCTED AN INDISPUTABLY EQUITABLE BALANCE OF OBLIGATIONS FOR EACH SIDE.

ON JUNE 8, THE EAST RESPONDED WITH NEW PROPOSALS OF ITS OWN. THE STUDY AND ASSESSMENT OF THESE PROPOSALS BY WESTERN AUTHORITIES IS CONTINUING. FOR THE PRESENT, I WOULD LIKE TO BRING TOGETHER ON AN INTERIM BASIS COMMENTS ON INDIVIDUAL ASPECTS OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS WHICH WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES HERE IN VIENNA HAVE MADE SINCE THE PROPOSALS WERE PRESENTED.

WESTERN PARTICIPANTS DO NOT HESITATE TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE EASTERN PROPOSALS OF JUNE 8 CONTAIN MOVES OF SIGNIFICANCE ON CERTAIN ISSUES OF CONCERN TO THE WEST. FOR EXAMPLE, THE JUNE 8 PROPOSALS ACCEPT IN PRINCIPLE A FOCUS ON GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS, A COMMON MANPOWER CEILING, COLLECTIVITY OF MANPOWER LIMITATIONS, LARGER SOVIET THAN US MANPOWER REDUCTIONS IN PHASE I, SELECTIVE REDUCTION OF DIFFERENT US AND SOVIET ARMAMENTS, AND FREEDOM OF DECISION OF PARTICIPANTS REGARDING FORCE ELEMENTS WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN EXPRESSLY LIMITED BY AN

AGREEMENT.

THESE MOVES OF PRINCIPLE HAVE CONSIDERABLE POTENTIAL
IMPORTANCE FOR THE FORMULATION OF A POSSIBLE FUTURE AGREEMENT.

HOWEVER, THE DISCUSSION OF THE JUNE 8 PROPOSALS WHICH HAS
TAKEN PLACE THUS FAR HAS MADE CLEAR THAT, DESPITE AGREEMENT IN
PRINCIPLE ON SOME ISSUES, SERIOUS DIFFERENCES REMAIN.
MOREOVER, THE MEANS PROPOSED BY THE EAST TO IMPLEMENT THESE

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AMEMBASSY BONN
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 5 MBFR VIENNA 0448

NEWLY AGREED PRINCIPLES WOULD CREATE MAJOR PROBLEMS. LET ME
TURN TO SOME OF THEM NOW.

THE DATA ISSUE HAS LONG BEEN THE MAJOR OPEN ISSUE OF THESE
NEGOTIATIONS. IT REMAINS SO TODAY. DISCUSSION OF DATA DURING
THIS ROUND HAS IMPROVED OUR UNDERSTANDING OF HOW THE EASTERN
PARTICIPANTS HAVE ALLOCATED THE FIGURES THEY HAVE PRESENTED
FOR WARSAW PACT MILITARY MANPOWER BETWEEN MAJOR FORMATIONS AND
OTHERS. BUT NO CLARIFICATION OF THE REASONS FOR THE DISCREPANCY
BETWEEN WESTERN AND EASTERN FIGURES ON EASTERN MILITARY MANPOWER
IN THE AREA HAS EMERGED. DURING THE PRESENT ROUND, WE
HAVE ONCE MORE TRIED TO EXPLAIN TO EASTERN PARTICIPANTS SOME OF
THE REASONS WHY WE CONTINUE TO BE SKEPTICAL THAT EASTERN DATA
ARE COMPLETE, AND WHY WE CONTINUE TO BE CONFIDENT THAT WESTERN
DATA ON EASTERN MILITARY MANPOWER ARE ACCURATE. IT IS CLEARLY

TIME TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE. THE WEST CANNOT ACCEPT AN OUTCOME
BASED ON KNOWN, SERIOUS DIFFERENCES REGARDING THE FACTS ABOUT
MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THERE CAN BE NO
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DECISIVE PROGRESS TOWARD AN AGREEMENT ON REDUCTIONS AND
LIMITATIONS UNTIL THE DISCREPANCY IS RESOLVED AND AGREEMENT IS
ATTAINED ON A DATA BASE.

IN THEIR JUNE 8 PROPOSALS, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAVE
ACCEPTED THE CONCEPT OF PARITY IN MILITARY MANPOWER AS THE
OUTCOME OF THESE TALKS. THIS IS AN IMPORTANT AGREEMENT IN
PRINCIPLE. BUT THE PROPOSED METHOD OF IMPLEMENTATION IS
DEFECTIVE. UNDER THE EASTERN PROPOSALS, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
EASTERN REDUCTIONS IN ORDER TO REACH PARITY WOULD
BE BASED ON
THE TABLED EASTERN DATA. THUS FOR THE REASONS I HAVE JUST
STATED, THIS POTENTIALLY USEFUL EASTERN MOVE OF PRINCIPLE IS NOT
YET OF PRACTICAL VALUE. INSTEAD, THE REDUCTIONS PROPOSED
BY THE EAST WOULD CONTRACTUALIZE EASTERN NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY
IN MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE AREA. THE DETRIMENTAL EFFECT WHICH
THIS WOULD HAVE ON WESTERN SECURITY WOULD BE INTENSIFIED BY THE
FACT THAT THE LARGE FORCES IN THE SOVIET UNION DIRECTLY
ADJACENT TO THE AREA WOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO REDUCTIONS OR
LIMITATIONS AS TO SIZE UNDER AN AGREEMENT AND COULD EVEN
INCREASE.

AGAIN, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS IN THEIR JUNE 8 PROPOSALS HAVE
ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE THAT MANPOWER LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE
COLLECTIVE. HOWEVER, THE EASTERN PROPOSALS FOR IMPLEMENTING
THIS NOW AGREED PRINCIPLE CONTAIN STRONG ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL
CEILINGS WHICH COULD INTERFERE WITH THE INTEGRATED NATO DEFENSE
SYSTEM AND PREJUDICE THE FUTURE ORGANIZATION OF WESTERN
EUROPEAN DEFENSE. THE PROPOSED IMPLEMENTATION COULD ALSO
EFFECTIVELY PREVENT WESTERN PARTICIPANTS FROM MAINTAINING THE
AGREED POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVEL IN THE EVENT OF LATER
UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS. MOREOVER, THE EASTERN APPROACH WOULD IN
ADDITION PERMIT THE SOVIET UNION TO RETURN ALMOST IMMEDIATELY
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TO ITS PRE-REDUCTION STRENGTH IN MILITARY MANPOWER. THE
METHOD FOR APPLYING THE COLLECTIVITY PRINCIPLE WHICH HAS BEEN
PROPOSED BY THE EAST COULD THUS RESULT IN A SITUATION WHERE THE
WEST WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO MAINTAIN ITS MAXIMUM MANPOWER LEVEL
ALLOWED UNDER AN AGREEMENT, BUT WHERE SOVIET MANPOWER IN THE
AREA WOULD HAVE RETURNED TO THEIR STARTING LEVEL, WHILE THE

LARGE SOVIET FORCES IN THE ADJACENT SOVIET UNION, FORCES WHICH WOULD NOT BE UNDER ANY LIMITATION AS TO SIZE, MIGHT HAVE INCREASED STILL FURTHER. IT IS EVIDENT THAT SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WOULD SERIOUSLY DIMINISH THE SECURITY OF WESTERN PARTICIPANTS.

IT SHOULD NOT BE UP TO WESTERN PARTICIPANTS TO FIND WAYS OF AVOIDING THE DESTABILIZING DEFECTS WHICH WOULD RESULT FROM CARRYING OUT THE EASTERN PROPOSALS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE COLLECTIVITY PRINCIPLE. RATHER, IT IS FOR THE EAST TO GIVE REAL SIGNIFICANCE TO ITS MOVES OF PRINCIPLE ON THIS AND OTHER ASPECTS OF A POTENTIAL AGREEMENT BY SUGGESTING PRACTICAL MEANS OF APPLICATION WHICH DO NOT GIVE RISE TO NEW PROBLEMS, AS HAS OCCURRED IN THIS INSTANCE AS REGARDS MANPOWER LIMITATIONS. WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAVE ALREADY MADE PROPOSALS UNDER WHICH SITUATIONS OF THIS KIND I HAVE JUST DESCRIBED WOULD NOT ARISE.

THE QUESTION OF PHASE I COMMITMENTS REGARDING PHASE II REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ALSO CLEARLY REMAINS AT ISSUE. THIS IS UNFORTUNATE, BECAUSE, IN THE VIEW OF WESTERN PARTICIPANTS, THE WEST'S APRIL 19 PROPOSALS SHOULD HAVE RESOLVED THIS ISSUE. EASTERN PARTICIPANTS IN THE PAST FREQUENTLY CALLED FOR A GENERAL COMMITMENT REGARDING THE SCOPE AND TIMING OF PHASE II REDUCTIONS BY THE WESTERN EUROPEAN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND

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R 191714Z JUL 78
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
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INFO USMISSION USNATO
AMEMBASSY BONN
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 5 MBFR VIENNA 0448

CANADA. ON APRIL 19, WESTERN PARTICIPANTS OFFERED A FIRM AND BINDING COMMITMENT REGARDING THE SCOPE AND TIMING OF REDUCTION OF THIS COMPONENT OF WESTERN MANPOWER IN THE AREA. THIS COMMITMENT SHOULD BE OF CONSIDERABLE VALUE TO THE EAST.

THE EAST REQUEST FOR A GENERAL COMMITMENT FOR PHASE II, AND THE WESTERN RESPONSE TO IT ON APRIL 19, WERE BOTH BASED ON THE APPROACH THAT THE DISCUSSION OF THE MODALITIES FOR PHASE II REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE RESERVED FOR PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS. HOWEVER, THE COMMITMENTS CALLED FOR BY THE EAST IN PHASE I WOULD IN PRACTICE ENTAIL PRIOR WESTERN AGREEMENT IN PHASE I TO MOST OF THE KEY ELEMENTS OF THE EASTERN NEGOTIATING PROGRAM FOR PHASE II.

THIS PARTICULAR PROBLEM IN THE EASTERN APPROACH IS AGGRAVATED BY THE PROPOSED PROVISION IN PHASE I GIVING THE SOVIET UNION THE RIGHT TO REVOKE UNILATERALLY ALL ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN IN PHASE I IF IT WERE DISSATISFIED WITH THE CONFIDENTIAL

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PATTERN OF PHASE II ARMAMENT AND UNIT REDUCTIONS WHICH THE EAST WANTS FROM THE WESTERN EUROPEAN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND CANADA. A PROVISION WHICH WOULD PERMIT ALL THE HARD-WON RESULTS OF A FIRST AGREEMENT ON REDUCTIONS TO BE DISCARDED IS NO SOLUTION. THE APRIL 19 WESTERN APPROACH IS A BETTER WAY OF DEALING WITH THE ISSUE OF HOW PHASE I OBLIGATIONS COULD BE IMPLEMENTED IF PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS DO NOT COME TO A TIMELY CONCLUSION.

AT THE OUTSET OF MY REMARKS, I DESCRIBED HOW THE WEST IN A NUMBER OF MOVES, INCLUDING TWO OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE, HAS PROPOSED AN APPROACH WHICH WOULD RESULT IN AN INDISPUTABLY EQUITABLE BALANCE OF OBLIGATIONS ON BOTH SIDES. BUT, IN ITS JUNE 8 PROPOSAL, THE EAST IS ASKING THE WEST TO UNDERTAKE IN PHASE I NOT ONLY ALL THE OBLIGATIONS WHICH THE WEST ITSELF HAS OFFERED TO UNDERTAKE, BUT ALSO ADDITIONAL BURDENSOME REQUIREMENTS, INCLUDING PHASE II REDUCTION BY UNITS AND FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS IN PHASE II. IN RETURN, THE EAST IS OFFERING REDUCTION OF SOVIET MANPOWER AND ARMAMENTS IN PHASE I, AND FURTHER WARSAW PACT MANPOWER REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II WHICH, TAKEN TOGETHER, ARE FAR LESS THAN WHAT THE WEST HAS ASKED FOR FROM THE EAST, AND FAR LESS THAN WHAT THE WEST IS OFFERING TO TAKE UPON ITSELF. CLEARLY, THERE IS A NEED FOR EASTERN PARTICIPANTS TO RE-EXAMINE THE PACKAGE THEY HAVE PROPOSED FROM THE STANDPOINT OF BALANCE.

THERE ARE A NUMBER OF ISSUES ON WHICH THE PRESENT EASTERN POSITION IS UNCLEAR. FOR EXAMPLE, WESTERN PARTICIPANTS DO NOT YET UNDERSTAND WHAT WOULD BE THE PRACTICAL EFFECT OF THE TYPE OF LIMITS ADVOCATED BY THE JUNE 8 PROPOSALS ON UNITS AND ON CIVILIANS IN MILITARY POSITIONS. IN ADDITION, THE JUNE 8

PROPOSALS STILL DO NOT ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF ASSOCIATED
MEASURES, WHICH FORMS PART OF THE AGREED SUBJECT MATTER OF
THESE TALKS. FURTHERMORE, THE EASTERN POSITION AS IT NOW
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STANDS DOES NOT ADEQUATELY PROVIDE FOR SAFEGUARDING THE
SECURITY OF THE FLANK COUNTRIES.

I WOULD LIKE NOW TO CALL ATTENTION TO AN IMPORTANT FACTOR
WHICH UNDERLIES MANY OF THESE DEFICIENCIES OF THE JUNE 8
PROPOSALS. IT IS THAT EASTERN PARTICIPANTS CONTINUE TO IGNORE
THE IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES IN THE GEOGRAPHIC SITUATION OF
VARIOUS PARTICIPANTS, AND SEEK TO PLACE FORMALLY IDENTICAL
OBLIGATIONS OF IDENTICAL WEIGHT FOR EACH PARTICIPANT.
INSTEAD, IT WOULD PLACE MORE BURDENSOME OBLIGATIONS ON SOME
PARTICIPANTS THAN ON OTHERS. A REDUCTION OBLIGATION ON THE
FORCES OF A COUNTRY WHOSE TERRITORY IS WITHIN THE AREA IS FAR
MORE BURDENSOME THAN THE SAME REDUCTION OBLIGATION ON THE
FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA OF THE SOVIET UNION, WHOSE
TERRITORY IS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE AREA, BUT IMMEDIATELY ADJACENT
TO IT. THIS UNEQUAL EASTERN APPROACH TO REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS
WOULD RESULT IN SIGNIFICANT UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE FOR THE EAST.

WESTERN PARTICIPANTS BELIEVE THAT THE PROSPECTS FOR
PROGRESS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE GREATLY ENHANCED BY
EASTERN RECOGNITION THAT THE WAY TO PLACE ALL STATES IN AN
IDENTICAL SITUATION OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY IS TO CONSTRUCT A
BALANCED PACKAGE FOR REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ON EACH SIDE
WHOSE TERMS TAKE FULL ACCOUNT OF THE IMPACT OF THE GEOGRAPHIC
FACTOR ON INDIVIDUAL OBLIGATIONS. THE WESTERN PROPOSALS DO
THIS. THEY DO IT IN THEIR APPROACH TO THE TOPIC OF MANPOWER
LIMITATIONS, THEIR OPPOSITION TO ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS BY WESTERN

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 4 OF 5 MBFR VIENNA 0448

EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS AND CANADA, AND IN THEIR DEMAND FOR
GENUINE PARITY IN THE AREA, WITH ELIMINATION OF THE EASTERN
SUPERIORITY IN MILITARY MANPOWER.

TO SUM UP MY REMARKS: WESTERN PARTICIPANTS ARE CONTINUING
TO EXAMINE THE EASTERN JUNE 8 PROPOSALS. THESE PROPOSALS DO
REPRESENT THE FIRST MODIFICATION IN ANY WAY OF THE OUTCOME
ENVISAGED BY THE EASTERN PROPOSALS OF NOVEMBER 1973. IF THESE
PROPOSALS CAN BE TAKEN AS EVIDENCE OF EASTERN WILLINGNESS IN
THE FUTURE TO ADOPT A MORE FLEXIBLE APPROACH TO THE MAIN ISSUES
OF THESE TALKS, THEN, TOGETHER WITH THE WESTERN PROPOSALS OF
APRIL 19, THEY OFFER SOME PROMISE THAT PARTICIPANTS CAN FINALLY
BEGIN TO MAKE REAL PROGRESS TOWARD AN AGREEMENT. IF THE EAST,
HAVING AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO SOME IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF THE
WESTERN APPROACH, COULD NOW CONSIDER THE COMMENTS WE HAVE MADE
AS TO THE PROBLEMS WHICH ARE CAUSED BY THE SPECIFIC METHODS
WHICH THE EAST HAS CHOSEN TO IMPLEMENT THESE PRINCIPLES, AND
WOULD REVISE THESE METHODS IN THE SPIRIT OF THESE WESTERN
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COMMENTS, THEN GENUINE FORWARD MOVEMENT IN OUR TALKS COULD BE
ASSURED. ABOVE ALL, WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WISH AT THIS POINT TO
EMPHASIZE THAT AGREEMENT ON DATA REMAINS THE CENTRAL ISSUE OF
THESE TALKS. END TEXT

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 5 OF 5 MBFR VIENNA 0448

BEGIN TEXT

I WISH TO CONCLUDE WITH A PERSONAL STATEMENT:

THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOVIET UNION IN HIS REMARKS JUST REFERRED TO WHAT HE CALLS THE NEUTRON BOMB. I REGRET THIS REMARK BECAUSE THIS SUBJECT HAS NO PLACE IN THESE DISCUSSIONS. NO PROPOSALS ON THIS TOPIC HAVE BEEN MADE BY EITHER SIDE IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND IT IS THE GOOD CUSTOM OF THESE TALKS NOT TO PERMIT OUTSIDE DEVELOPMENT TO INTRUDE ON THEM. SINCE, HOWEVER, THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOVIET UNION HAS REFERRED TO THIS TOPIC, I WOULD COMMENT THAT IT HARDLY SEEMS REASONABLE THAT THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD ALLUDE TO A WESTERN WEAPON WHICH DOES NOT NOW EXIST AND THAT HE SHOULD AT THE SAME TIME IGNORE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR WESTERN SECURITY OF A SOVIET WEAPONS SYSTEM, THE SS20, WHICH DOES EXIST AND IS NOW BEING DEPLOYED. AS IS KNOWN, THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES HAS

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ANNOUNCED A DECISION TO DEFER PRODUCTION OF WEAPONS WITH ENHANCED RADIATION EFFECTS. THIS DECISION REMAINS IN EFFECT.

END TEXT. DEAN

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Message Attributes

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